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Abstract
In this paper we propose a computational framework aimed at extending the prob-
lem solving capabilities of cognitive artificial agents through the introduction of a
novel, goal-directed, dynamic knowledge generation mechanism obtained via a non
monotonic reasoning procedure. In particular, the proposed framework relies on the
assumption that certain classes of problems cannot be solved by simply learning or in-
jecting new external knowledge in the declarative memory of a cognitive artificial agent
but, on the other hand, require a mechanism for the automatic and creative re-framing,
or re-formulation, of the available knowledge. We show how such mechanism can be
obtained trough a framework of dynamic knowledge generation that is able to tackle
the problem of commonsense concept combination. In addition, we show how such a
framework can be employed in the field of cognitive architectures in order to overcome
situations like the impasse in SOAR by extending the possible options of its subgoaling
procedures.
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1. Introduction
Goal-directed problem solving is a crucial everyday activity for both natural and
artificial systems. A straightforward assumption in goal-directed systems is that, in the
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cases where a given goal cannot be reached, a replanning strategy is required in order
to change the original goal and/or reconfigure the set of actions originally selected to
perform that goal [2]. Usually such goal reconfiguration is based on the availability of
novel, additional, knowledge that can be then used to select novel sub-goals or novel
operations to carry on. In this work, we consider those situations where the solution to a
given problem cannot come with the classical means usually adopted for obtaining new
knowledge (and leading to a goal-redefinition). In particular, we consider scenarios
where the availability of novel knowledge cannot be obtained in an extrinsic way (e.g.
via communication with another agent or, via a novel learning process or by an external
injection of novel knowledge in the declarative memory of an artificial system). On the
other hand, in such scenarios, the key to the problem solution lies in an intrinsic agent
capability of automatically generating novel knowledge by recombining, in a dynamic
and innovative way, the possessed knowledge in order to look with new eyes to the
problem in hand and solve it.
In this paper we present a framework for the dynamic and automatic generation
of novel knowledge obtained through a process of commonsense reasoning based on
typicality-based concept combination. We exploit a recently introduced extension of a
Description Logic of typicality able to combine prototypical descriptions of concepts
in order to generate new prototypical concepts. Intuitively, in the context of our ap-
plication of this logic, the overall pipeline works as follows: given a goal expressed
as a set of properties, if the knowledge base does not contain a concept able to fulfill
all these properties, then our system looks for two concepts to recombine in order to
extend the original knowledge base and satisfy the goal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the rationale
of our proposal. In section 3 we formally describe the Description Logic of typicality
used for generating novel knowledge in order to achieve a given goal by combining
commonsense representations of concepts. In section 4 we describe the system adopt-
ing the proposed logic, whose efficacy is tested in section 5 in the task of object com-
position. In section 6 we show how the proposed framework is compliant with all the
major SOAR mechanism and can be used to extend its subgoaling procedures. Finally,
in section 7 we survey related approaches and conclude with a discussion on future
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works.
2. Commonsense Concept Invention via Dynamic Knowledge Combination
Inventing novel concepts by combining the typical knowledge of pre-existing ones
is among the most creative cognitive abilities exhibited by humans. This generative
phenomenon highlights some crucial aspects of the knowledge processing capabilities
in human cognition and concerns high-level capacities associated to creative thinking
and problem solving. Still, it represents an open challenge in the field of artificial in-
telligence [6]. Dealing with this problem requires, from an AI and cognitive modelling
perspective, the harmonization of two conflicting requirements that are hardly accom-
modated in symbolic systems [10]): the need of a syntactic and semantic composition-
ality (typical of logical systems) and that one concerning the exhibition of typicality
effects. According to a well-known argument [42], in fact, prototypes (i.e. common-
sense conceptual representations based on typical properties) are not compositional.
The argument runs as follows: consider a concept like pet fish. It results from the
composition of the concept pet and of the concept fish. However, the prototype of pet
fish cannot result from the composition of the prototypes of a pet and a fish: e.g. a
typical pet is furry and warm, a typical fish is grayish, but a typical pet fish is neither
furry and warm nor grayish (typically, it is red). In this work we exploit a framework
able to account for this type of human-like concept combination and propose to use it
as a novel mechanism able to expand the spectrum of subgoaling procedures in cogni-
tive artificial systems. In particular, we adopt a nonmonotonic extension of Description
Logics (from now on DL) 1 able to reason on typicality and calledTCL (typicality-based
1Description Logics are a class of decidedable fragments of first order logics that are at the base of
Ontology Web Language (OWL) used for the realization of computational ontologies. Nowadays DLs are
the most important and widespread symbolic knowledge-representation systems. Their success is justified,
on the one hand, by the fact that DLs have a well defined semantics and, on the other hand, by the fact that
they offer a good trade-off between expressivity of the language and computational complexity. According to
DLs, a knowledge base contains two components: 1. a TBox, containing inclusion relations among concepts,
for instance Cat v Mammal (cats are mammals); 2. an ABox, containing facts about individuals, for
instance Cat(tom) (Tom is a cat). We remind to [4] for a complete introduction to DLs.
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compositional logic) introduced in [29].
This logic combines two main ingredients. The first one relies on the DL of typical-
ity ALC +TR introduced in [16], which allows to describe the protoype of a concept.
In this logic, “typical” properties can be directly specified by means of a “typical-
ity” operator T enriching the underlying DL, and a TBox can contain inclusions of
the form T(C) v D to represent that “typical Cs are also Ds”. As a difference
with standard DLs, in the logic ALC + TR one can consistently express exceptions
and reason about defeasible inheritance as well. For instance, a knowledge base can
consistently express that “normally, athletes are fit”, whereas “sumo wrestlers usu-
ally are not fit” by T(Athlete) v Fit and T(SumoWrestler) v ¬Fit , given that
SumoWreslter v Athlete . The semantics of the T operator is characterized by the
properties of rational logic [23], recognized as the core properties of nonmonotonic
reasoning. ALC +TR is characterized by a minimal model semantics corresponding
to an extension to DLs of a notion of rational closure as defined in [23] for propo-
sitional logic: the idea is to adopt a preference relation among ALC + TR models,
where intuitively a model is preferred to another one if it contains less exceptional ele-
ments, as well as a notion of minimal entailment restricted to models that are minimal
with respect to such preference relation. As a consequence,T inherits well-established
properties like specificity and irrelevance: in the example, the logicALC+TR allows
us to inferT(Athlete uBald) v Fit (being bald is irrelevant with respect to being fit)
and, if one knows that Hiroyuki is a typical sumo wrestler, to infer that he is not fit,
giving preference to the most specific information.
As a second ingredient, we consider a distributed semantics similar to the one of
probabilistic DLs known as DISPONTE [43], allowing to label inclusions T(C) v D
with a real number between 0.5 and 1, representing its degree of belief/probability, as-
suming that each axiom is independent from each others. Degrees of belief in typicality
inclusions allow to define a probability distribution over scenarios: roughly speaking,
a scenario is obtained by choosing, for each typicality inclusion, whether it is con-
sidered as true or false2. In a slight extension of the above example, we could have
2 We do not employ the whole characteristics of DISPONTE: as far as the inferential capabilities are
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the need of representing that both the typicality inclusions about athletes and sumo
wrestlers have a degree of belief of 80%, whereas we also believe that athletes are usu-
ally young with a higher degree of 95%, with the following KB: (1) SumoWrestler v
Athlete; (2) 0.8 :: T(Athlete) v Fit ; (3) 0.8 :: T(SumoWrestler) v ¬Fit ;
(4) 0.95 :: T(Athlete) v YoungPerson . We consider eight different scenar-
ios, representing all possible combinations of typicality inclusion: as an example,
{((2), 1), ((3), 0), ((4), 1)} represents the scenario in which (2) and (4) hold, whereas
(3) does not. We equip each scenario with a probability depending on those of the
involved inclusions: the scenario of the example, has probability 0.8 × 0.95 (since 2
and 4 are involved) ×(1 − 0.8) (since 3 is not involved) = 0.152 = 15.2%. Such
probabilities are then taken into account in order to choose the most adequate scenario
describing the prototype of the combined concept. As an additional element of the pro-
posed formalization we employ a method inspired by cognitive semantics [18] for the
identification of a dominance effect between the concepts to be combined: for every
combination, we distinguish a HEAD, representing the stronger element of the combi-
nation, and a MODIFIER. The basic idea is: given a KB and two conceptsCH (HEAD)
and CM (MODIFIER) occurring in it, we consider only some scenarios in order to de-
fine a revised knowledge base, enriched by typical properties of the combined concept
C v CH u CM . In [29], we have shown that the procedure for combining concepts
in the logic TCL is essentially inexpensive, in the sense that reasoning in this logic is
EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying standard Description Logic ALC.
We extend a preliminary result by [29], and we show that the logicTCL can be used
to extend the problem solving and subgoaling procedure of cognitive agents.
3. A Non Monotonic Reasoning Framework for Concept Combination
In this section, we describe the nonmonotonic Description LogicTCL that combines
the semantics based on the rational closure of ALC + TR [16] with the DISPONTE
semantics [43] of probabilistic DLs.
concerned, we exclusively adopt ALC +TR, whereas we use DISPONTE only as a (necessary) ingredient
to generate all different knowledge bases obtained by considering different subsets of typicality inclusions.
5
By taking inspiration from [33], in our representational assumptions we consider
two types of properties associated to a given concept: rigid and typical. Rigid proper-
ties are those defining a concept, e.g. C v D (all Cs are Ds). Typical properties are
represented by inclusions equipped by a degree of belief expressed through probabili-
ties like in the DISPONTE semantics. Additionally, as mentioned, we employ insights
coming from the cognitive science for the determination of a dominance effect between
the concepts to be combined, distinguishing between concept HEAD and MODIFIER.
Since the conceptual combination is usually expressed via natural language we con-
sider the following common situations: in a combination ADJECTIVE - NOUN (for
instance, red apple) the HEAD is represented by the NOUN (apple) and the modifier
by the ADJECTIVE (red). In the more complex case of NOUN-NOUN combinations
(for instance, pet fish) usually the HEAD is represented by the last expressed concept
(fish in this case)3.
The language of TCL extends the basic DL ALC by typicality inclusions of the
formT(C) v D equipped by a real number p ∈ (0.5, 1] – observe that the extreme 0.5
is not included – representing its degree of belief, whose meaning is that “we believe
with degree/probability p that, normally, Cs are alsoD” (the reason why we only allow
typicality inclusions equipped with p > 0.5 is detailed below).
Definition 3.1 (Language of TCL). We consider an alphabet of concept names C, of
role names R, and of individual constants O. Given A ∈ C and R ∈ R, we define:
C,D := A | > | ⊥ | ¬C | C u C | C unionsq C | ∀R.C | ∃R.C
We define a knowledge base K = 〈R, T ,A〉 where:
• R is a finite set of rigid properties of the form C v D;
• T is a finite set of typicality properties of the form
p :: T(C) v D
3It is worth-noting that a general framework for the automatic identification of a HEAD/MODIFIER
combination is currently not available in literature. In this work we will take for granted that some methods
for the correct identification of these pairs exist and we describe the reasoning part.
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where p ∈ (0.5, 1] ⊆ R is the degree of belief of the typicality inclusion;
• A is the ABox, i.e. a finite set of formulas of the form either C(a) or R(a, b), where
a, b ∈ O and R ∈ R.
As mentioned, following the DISPONTE semantics, in TCL each typicality inclusion
is independent from each others. This avoids the problem of dealing with degrees of
inconsistent inclusions.
As indicated above, we do not avoid typicality inclusions with degree 1. Indeed,
an inclusion 1 :: T(C) v D means that there is no uncertainty about a given typical-
ity inclusion. On the other hand, since the very cognitive notion of typicality derives
from that one of probability distribution [44], and this latter notion is also intrinsically
connected to the one concerning the level of uncertainty/degree of belief associated
to typicality inclusions (i.e. typical knowledge is known to come with a low degree
of uncertainty [22]), we only allow typicality inclusions equipped with degrees of be-
lief p > 0.5. For such reason, in our effort of integrating two different semantics –
DISPONTE and typicality logic – the choice of having degrees higher than 0.5 for typ-
icality inclusions seems to be the only one compliant with both the formalisms. In fact,
despite the DISPONTE semantics in [43] allows to assign also low degrees of belief to
standard inclusions, in the logicTCL, for what explained above, it would be misleading
to also allow low degrees of belief for typicality inclusions. For example, the logicTCL
does not allow an inclusion like 0.3 :: T(Student) v YoungPerson , that could be
interpreted as “normally, students are not young people”. Please, note that this is not a
limitation of the expressivity of the logic TCL: we can in fact represent properties not
holding for typical members of a category, for instance if one needs to represent that
typical students are not married, we can have that 0.8 :: T(Student) v ¬Married ,
rather than 0.2 :: T(Student) v Married .
A modelM in the logicTCL extends standardALC models by a preference relation
among domain elements as in the logic of typicality [16]. In this respect, x < y means
that x is “more normal” than y, and that the typical members of a concept C are the
minimal elements of C with respect to this relation. An element x ∈ ∆I is a typical
instance of some concept C if x ∈ CI and there is no C-element in ∆I more normal
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than x. Formally:
Definition 3.2 (Model of TCL). A model M is any structure 〈∆I , <, .I〉 where: (i)
∆I is a non empty set of items called the domain; (ii) < is an irreflexive, transitive,
well-founded and modular (for all x, y, z in ∆I , if x < y then either x < z or z < y)
relation over ∆I; (iii) .I is the extension function that maps each atomic concept C to
CI ⊆ ∆I , and each role R to RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I , and is extended to complex concepts
as usual for concepts of ALC, whereas for typicality concepts we define (T(C))I =
Min<(C
I), where Min<(CI) = {x ∈ CI |6 ∃y ∈ CI such that y < x}.
A model M can be equivalently defined by postulating the existence of a function
kM : ∆I 7−→ N, where kM assigns a finite rank to each domain element: the rank of
x is the length of the longest chain x0 < . . . < x from x to a minimal x0, i.e. such
that there is no x′ such that x′ < x0. The rank function kM and < can be defined from
each other by letting x < y if and only if kM(x) < kM(y).
Given a KB K = 〈R, T ,A〉 and a modelM = 〈∆I , <, .I〉, we assume that .I is
extended to assign a domain element aI of ∆I to each individual constant a of O. We
say that (i)M satisfies R if, for all C v D ∈ R, we have CI ⊆ DI ; (ii)M satisfies
T if, for all q :: T(C) v D ∈ T , we have thatT(C)I ⊆ DI , i.e. Min<(CI) ⊆ DI ;
(iii)M satisfies A if, for all assertion F ∈ A, if F = C(a) then aI ∈ CI , otherwise
if F = R(a, b) then (aI , bI) ∈ RI .
Even if the typicality operator T itself is nonmonotonic (i.e. T(C) v E does not
imply T(C u D) v E), what is inferred from a KB can still be inferred from any
KB’ with KB ⊆ KB’, i.e. the resulting logic is monotonic. In order to perform useful
nonmonotonic inferences, in [16] the authors have strengthened the semantics of the
DL with typicality by restricting entailment to a class of minimal models. Intuitively,
the idea is to restrict entailment to models that minimize the untypical instances of a
concept. The resulting logic ALC + TR corresponds to a notion of rational closure
for DLs as a natural extension of the construction provided in [23] for the propositional
logic. This nonmonotonic semantics relies on minimal rational models that minimize
the rank of domain elements. Informally, given two models of KB, one in which a given
domain element x has rank 2 (because for instance z < y < x), and another in which
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it has rank 1 (because only y < x), we prefer the latter, as in this model the element x
is assumed to be “more typical” than in the former. Query entailment is then restricted
to minimal canonical models. The intuition is that a canonical model contains all the
individuals that enjoy properties that are consistent with the KB. This is needed when
reasoning about the rank of the concepts: it is important to have them all represented.
A query F is minimally entailed from a KB if it holds in all minimal canonical models
of KB. In [16] it is shown that query entailment in the nonmonotonic ALC +TR is in
EXPTIME.
Let us now define the notion of scenario of the composition of concepts. Intuitively,
a scenario is a knowledge base obtained by adding to all rigid properties in R and to
all ABox facts in A only a subset of typicality inclusions in T .
Definition 3.3 (Atomic choice). Given K = 〈R, T ,A〉, where T = {E1 = q1 ::
T(C1) v D1, . . . , En = qn :: T(Cn) v Dn} we define (Ei, ki) an atomic choice,
where ki ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 3.4 (Selection). Given K = 〈R, T ,A〉, where T = {E1 = q1 :: T(C1) v
D1, . . . , En = qn :: T(Cn) v Dn} and a set of atomic choices ν, we say that ν
is a selection if, for each Ei, one decision is taken, i.e. either (Ei, 0) ∈ ν and (Ei,
1) 6∈ ν or (Ei, 1) ∈ ν and (Ei, 0) 6∈ ν for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The probability of ν is
P (ν) =
∏
(Ei,1)∈ν
qi
∏
(Ei,0)∈ν
(1− qi).
Definition 3.5 (Scenario). Given K = 〈R, T ,A〉, where T = {E1 = q1 :: T(C1) v
D1, . . . , En = qn :: T(Cn) v Dn} and given a selection σ, we define a scenario
wσ = 〈R, {Ei | (Ei, 1) ∈ σ},A〉. We also define the probability of a scenario wσ
as the probability of the corresponding selection, i.e. P (wσ) = P (σ). Last, we say
that a scenario is consistent with respect to K when it admits a model in the logic TCL
satisfying K.
We denote with WK the set of all scenarios. It immediately follows that the proba-
bility of a scenario P (wσ) is a probability distribution over scenarios, that is to say∑
w∈WK
P (w) = 1.
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Given a KB K = 〈R, T ,A〉 and given two concepts CH and CM occurring in K, the
logic TCL allows defining a prototype of the compound concept C as the combination
of the HEAD CH and the MODIFIER CM , where the typical properties of the form
T(C) v D (or, equivalently, T(CH u CM ) v D) to ascribe to the concept C are
obtained by considering blocks of scenarios with the same probability, in decreasing
order starting from the highest one. We first discard all the inconsistent scenarios, then:
• we discard those scenarios considered as trivial, consistently inheriting all the
properties from the HEAD from the starting concepts to be combined. This
choice is motivated by the challenges provided by task of commonsense concep-
tual combination itself: in order to generate plausible and creative compounds it
is necessary to maintain a level of surprise in the combination. Thus both sce-
narios inheriting all the properties of the two concepts and all the properties of
the HEAD are discarded since prevent this surprise;
• among the remaining ones, we discard those inheriting properties from the MOD-
IFIER in conflict with properties that could be consistently inherited from the
HEAD;
• if the set of scenarios of the current block is empty, i.e. all the scenarios have
been discarded either because trivial or because preferring the MODIFIER, we
repeat the procedure by considering the block of scenarios, having the immedi-
ately lower probability.
Remaining scenarios with the highest probability are those selected by the logic TCL.
The ultimate output of our mechanism is a knowledge base in the logic TCL whose
set of typicality properties is enriched by those of the compound concept C. Given a
scenario w satisfying the above properties, we define the properties of C as the set of
inclusions p :: T(C) v D, for all T(C) v D that are entailed from w in the logic
TCL. The probability p is such that:
• if T(CH) v D is entailed from w, that is to say D is a property inherited
either from the HEAD (or from both the HEAD and the MODIFIER), then p
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corresponds to the degree of belief of such inclusion of the HEAD in the initial
knowledge base, i.e. p : T(CH) v D ∈ T ;
• otherwise, i.e. T(CM ) v D is entailed from w, then p corresponds to the degree
of belief of such inclusion of a MODIFIER in the initial knowledge base, i.e.
p : T(CM ) v D ∈ T .
The knowledge base obtained as the result of combining concepts CH and CM
into the compound concept C is called C-revised knowledge base, and it is defined as
follows:
KC = 〈R, T ∪ {p : T(C) v D},A〉,
for all D such that either T(CH) v D is entailed in w or T(CM ) v D is entailed in
w, and p is defined as above.
In [29] we have shown that reasoning in TCL remains in the same complexity class
of standard ALC Description Logics.
Theorem 3.6. Reasoning in TCL is EXPTIME-complete.
4. A Goal-directed System for Dynamic Knowledge Generation and Invention
In this section we describe a goal-directed system relying on the above illustrated
TCL logic 4. In particular, the system (available at the URL: http://di.unito.
it/GOCCIOLA) is able to dynamically generate novel knowledge in the cases in
which the original goal cannot be directly solved by a given agent only by resorting
to its available knowledge. The process of automatic knowledge generation, as men-
tioned, is obtained by adopting the process of commonsense concept combination of
TCL, namely: by combining concepts in the knowledge base which are relevant for the
task to solve.
The overall pipeline of the system can be described as follows: the system receives
in input a certain goal to achieve. The goal is expressed in terms of tuples representing
4In other works we have already shown how such logic can be used to model complex cognitive phenom-
ena [31] (including methaphors generation) and to build intelligent applications in the field of computational
creativity [30].
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the desired final state. For example: a goal can be expressed as {Object , Cutting ,
Graspable} to identify the scope of retrieving, from the inventory of the available
knowledge in the agent declarative memory, an element that is a graspable object able
to cut some surfaces. Once processed the input, the system verifies, via a searching
process in the hybrid, probabilistic, knowledge base assumed in TCL, whether there is
some element that can directly satisfy the desired conditions. If so, the element(s) (if
any) satisfying the request are returned and ranked in descending order of probability.
If not, the system tries to perform a task of semantic-driven goal-reformulation by look-
ing for WordNet synonyms and hyperonyms5 of the terms specified in input (in order
to find at least a minimal set of candidate concepts sharing, if considered jointly, all the
required goal desiderata). Once this process is also executed, and the minimal set of
candidate concepts that (jointly) can be combined to satisfy the goal is reached, the sys-
tem adopt the typicality-based reasoning procedure of concept combination developed
in TCL.
More formally:
Definition 4.1. Given a knowledge base K in the logic TCL, let G be a set of concepts
{D1, D2, . . . , Dn} called goal. We say that a concept C is a solution to the goal G if
either:
• for all Di ∈ G, either K |= C v Di or K |= T(C) v Di in the logic TCL
or
• C corresponds to the combination of, at least, two conceptsC1 andC2 occurring
in K, i.e. C ≡ C1 u C2, and the C-revised knowledge base KC provided by the
logic TCL is such that, for all Di ∈ G, either KC |= C v Di or KC |= T(C) v
Di.
5WordNet is a widely known lexical database for the English language [35]. Rather than organizing
terms alphabetically (like ordinary dictionaries, where senses are possibly scattered) WN groups terms into
synonyms sets called synsets, that are equipped with short definitions and usage examples. Such sets are
represented as the nodes of a large semantic network, where the intervening edges represent a number of se-
mantic relations among synset elements (such as hyponymy, hypernymy, antonymy, meronymy, holonymy).
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In case the goal cannot be achieved in a direct way (i.e. there is no element in the
KB satysfying the goal desiderata) the system computes a list of concepts of the initial
knowledge base satisfying at least a property of the goal (using Wordnet if the initial
goal formulation does not satisfy such condition). As an example, suppose to have:
G = {Object ,Graspable,Cutting},
and suppose that the following inclusions belong to the knowledge base:
Spoon v Graspable
0.85 :: T(Spoon) v ¬Cutting
0.9 :: T(Vase) v Graspable
Vase v Object
Both Vase and Spoon are included in the list of candidate concepts to be combined
(along with other concepts satysfying, for example other properties of the goal such as,
for example, being able to cut some surface). As a second step, for each item in the list
of candidate concepts to be combined, the system computes a rank of the concept as the
sum of the probabilities of the properties also belonging to the goal, assuming a score
of 1 in case of a rigid property. In the example, Vase is ranked as 0.9 + 1 = 1.9, since
both Graspable and Object are properties belonging to the goal: for the former we take
the probability 0.9 of the typicality inclusion T(Vase) v Graspable, for the latter we
provide a score of 1 since the property Vase v Object is rigid. Concerning the concept
Spoon , the system computes a rank of 1: indeed, the only inclusion matching the goal
is the rigid one Spoon v Graspable. Finally, the system checks whether the concept
obtained by combining the candidate concepts with the highest ranks, (e.g. C1 and C2
in case of only 2 concepts), is able to satisfy the initial goal. The system computes a
double attempt, by considering first C1 as the HEAD and C2 as the MODIFIER and,
in case of failure, C2 as the HEAD and C1 as the MODIFIER.
In order to combine the two candidate concepts C1 and C2, our system exploits
COCOS [28], a tool generating scenarios and choosing the selected one(s) according
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to the logic TCL. COCOS makes use of the library owlready2 6 that allows one to
rely on the services of efficient DL reasoners, e.g. the HermiT reasoner.
5. Experimentation
In this section, we describe the experimental setup and the obtained results of our
system in task of object composition of compound tools. Such ability represents a
very important creative faculty found only in primates (specifically, humans and great
apes) and, more recently in ravens [46]. It still represents an open challenge in the
field of AI and cognitive modelling. As we will see later in detail, in fact, a major
problem consists in the lack of realistic benchmarks for evaluating the performance on
this task for both humans and artificial systems (this problem is also explicitly reported
in [41] that represent, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt of modelling such
faculty in an artificial system). Despite the lack of such a benchmark, for our purposes
we tested our system on the same proof-of-concept evaluation presented in [41]. In
addition, we also provided a comparison with responses provided by human judges for
the concept composition task.
5.1. Setup
Knowledge about goals, objects and entities can be represented in the system in
symbolic terms. As an example, let us consider the above mentioned goal: object,
cutting, graspable. The initial knowledge base is formalized in the language of the
logic TCL and it is stored in a suitable file. Rigid properties, holding for all individ-
uals of a given class, are stored as pairs object-property, whereas typical properties
are formalized as triples object-property-probability. We have considered an extension
with probabilities of a portion of the ontology Open Cyc [24] 7 referring to physi-
cal objects and tools of ordinary use in a domestic environment (e.g. a glass, a vase
etc.). The considered branch of the Cyc ontology (formalized in standard Description
6https://pythonhosted.org/Owlready2/
7https://github.com/asanchez75/opencyc/blob/master/opencyc-latest.
owl.gz.
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Logic and, as a consequence, not able to represent and reason on typicality-based in-
formation) has been manually extended in the language of the logicTCL. Therefore the
symbolic representation of the ontological objects additionally includes the following
typical and functional characteristics: color, size, function, physical affordance, shape,
material. Please note that it was not mandatory to fill every property of the schema for
the description of objects.
As an example, the concept Vase is represented as follows (on the right the corre-
sponding knowledge base in TCL):
vase, object
vase, high convexity
vase, ceramic, 0.8
vase, to put plants, 0.9
vase, to contain objects, 0.9
vase, graspable, 0.9
Vase v Object
Vase v HighConvexity
0.8 :: T(Vase) v Ceramic
0.9 :: T(Vase) v ToPutPlants
0.9 :: T(Vase) v ToContainObjects
0.9 :: T(Vase) v Graspable
5.2. Results of Knowledge Generation via Concept Composition
We tested the proposed framework in the task of object composition. In particular,
for this task we used the same setup adopted in [41] by using a limited sample of the
Cyc ontology about domestic objects.
As mentioned in [41], there is no benchmark test available for this kind of task
on both human participants and artificial systems. Therefore, we tested our system
by comparing our results with the ones described by [41] (table 5, p.23) for the OROC
system (to the best of our knowledge, the only available in the literature) by considering
the 5 goals they used as testbed. In particular, we asked our system to combine objects
in order to obtain the following goals:
G1 = {Object ,Cutting ,Graspable},
G2 = {Object ,Graspable,LaunchingObjectsAtDistance},
G3 = {Object ,Support ,LiftingFromTheGround},
G4 = {CandlewithSupport},
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G5 = {Noteebook}
In particular, we discarded the goals 4 and 5 since they are intended as a compo-
sition based on a simple meronimy. Goal 4, in fact, is achievable by just composing
the two objects Candle and Candle Support available in the knowledge base. Also the
goal of realizing a Notebook was achievable by composing two constituents part of the
object available in the KB: Blank pages and Cover. Such goals can be easily reached
by using a standard Description Logic reasoner, without resorting to the sophistication
of TCL for the commonsense conceptual composition. For the goals 1, 2 and 3, on the
contrary we adopted the framework proposed in this paper.
As mentioned, we have considered an extension of the knowledge base Open Cyc
where we manually introduced, in the language of TCL, typicality-based properties/in-
clusions that were not originally available in the ontology due to the fact that standard
ontological semantics does not support representing and reasoning on typicality and ex-
ceptions [14, 11]. An example of the introduced inclusions/properties (for the concepts
Shelf, Stone, Stump, RubberBand) is reported below:
Shelf v Object
0.8 :: T(Shelf ) vWood
0.9 :: T(Shelf ) v Rectangular
0.8 :: T(Shelf ) v Containment
0.8 :: T(Shelf ) v Support
0.8 :: T(Stump) vWood
0.7 :: T(Stump) v Medium
0.8 :: T(Stump) v Linear
0.7 :: T(Stump) v LiftingFromGround
0.7 :: T(Stump) v Support
Stone v MineralAggregate
0.7 :: T(Stone) v Roundish
0.7 :: T(Stone) v Greyish
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0.7 :: T(Stone) v BuildingArrowHeads
0.8 :: T(Stone) v ShapingObjects
0.7 :: T(Stone) v Cutting
0.6 :: T(Stone) v Support
0.8 :: T(Stone) v StrikeAtDistance
0.9 :: T(Stone) v Graspable
0.7 :: T(Stone) v Narrow
RubberBand v Object
RubberBand v Plastic
0.9 :: T(RubberBand) v Propeller
0.9 :: T(RubberBand) v LaunchingObjectsAtDistance
0.7 :: T(RubberBand) v Small
Given a KB extended in TCL as reported above, we employed our system for solving
the first 3 goals. For what concerns the first goal, i.e. where the purpose of our intel-
ligent system consisted is looking for a graspable object able to cut, the system was
not able to find a unique object satisfying all the properties and, therefore, proposed
the combination Stone u Branch as a solution, thus suggesting a combined concept
having the characteristics resembling a rudimentary KnifeWithAWoodHandle
For what concerns the second goal, where the system was asked to look for a
graspable object able to launch objects at distance, the system combined the concepts
Branch and RubberBand , being those with the highest rank with respect to G2. The
(Branch u RubberBand)-revised knowledge base, suggested by adopting Branch as
the HEAD, is such that all the properties of both concepts are considered, with the
exception of Support . Therefore the knowledge base of the agent is extended (among
the others) by the following inclusions:
0.9 :: T(Branch u RubberBand) v Graspable
0.9 :: T(Branch u RubberBand) v LaunchingObjectsAtDistance
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and the combination Branch u RubberBand is a solution for the goal G2. The inten-
tional description of the combined concept for G2 corresponds to the concept Slingshot .
For what concerns the third goal, the system provides a solution by combining
Shelf and Stump. The intentional description of the combined concept for G3 corre-
sponds to the concept Table .
Therefore our system provided the same results provided in the OROC system. In
addition with respect to the work by [41] (that, on the other hand, collected human
data for the task of object substitution and not for the one of object composition), we
collected data from 36 human subjects that were asked to solve the same type of goal
by considering the same subset of domestic object considered by our system for the
combination. The results provided for the 3 goals are reported in Figure 1. In particular,
the most rated results are compliant with the results reported by both our system and
by OROC. Apart from the mere choice of the concept to select for the combination,
we also asked to the human subject to indicate which kind of object they were thinking
for justifying their combination (the datum is reported in the round parenthesis in the
table, along with the percentage of the people that responded in favor of the most
rated combination). Interestingly enough, human subjects were also able to provide
multiple valid solutions for these constrained goals. In particular, for the G1 they also
provided as solution the combination of the concepts Stone and Towel (justified as the
possibility of having a sort of soft material through which to handle a stone). For G2
the second most rated answer was RubberBand and Towel (justified with the idea of
passing the towel in the circular rubberband and using it as a sort of soft support for
the rubberband) while for G3 the second solution consisted in the combination of the
concepts Vase with Shelf (where the supporting element was constituted by the vase).
To test whether the system was able to provide similar results, we repeated the task by
deleting the originally obtained combination and by looking at its the second ranked
proposal (if any). For G1 the system was not able to find any suitable combination, for
G2 it proposed the combination of the concepts RubberBand and Book (with the latter
object used a rigid support) and for G3 the system proposed to combine the concepts
Stump and SurfingBoard (by using the latter element as a support). The figure 1 also
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reports the second most rated results from both human subjects and our system 8).
Figure 1: Comparison on Concept Composition in a Domestic Domain.
6. Beyond Subgoaling: Compliance and Extension of SOAR procedures
In this section we show how the proposed system can integrate, and extend, the
classical subgoaling mechanism embedded in a cognitive architecture like SOAR [20]
(with a particular reference to the impasse mechanisms developed in such architec-
ture). In our opinion, this compliance represents an important aspect to point out since
SOAR is one of the most mature cognitive architectures and has been used by many
researchers worldwide during the last 30 years in the field of cognitive modelling and
intelligent systems. This system was considered by Allen Newell a candidate for a
Unified Theory of Cognition [39] and still represents an important pillar in the effort
of building a general integrated model of cognition [21]. This system adheres strictly
to Newell and Simon’s physical symbol system hypothesis [40] which states that sym-
bolic processing is a necessary and sufficient condition for intelligent behavior. One
of the main themes in SOAR is that all cognitive tasks can be represented by problem
spaces that are searched by production rules grouped into operators. These production
rules are fired in parallel to produce reasoning cycles. From a representational perspec-
tive, SOAR exploits symbolic representations of knowledge (called chunks) and use
pattern matching to select relevant knowledge elements. Basically, when a production
8Additional results going beyond the 2nd most rated results are not reported since they only regard a
minimal percentage of answers.
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Figure 2: The SOAR Cognitive Architecture and, in red, the compliance with the proposed
system in order to extend the classical subgoaling procedure of the architecture.
rule matches the contents of declarative (working) memory, then the rule fires and the
content from the declarative memory (called Semantic Memory in SOAR) is retrieved.
Such type of knowledge structures, however, are usually heavily used to perform
standard logical reasoning and, as a consequence, are strongly biased towards a “clas-
sical” conceptualisation of knowledge in terms of necessary or sufficient conditions
and are not equipped with commonsense representational and reasoning knowledge
20
components 9. If a problem (an impasse in SOAR terms) arises due to the fact that
certain knowledge is lacking, resolving this impasse automatically becomes the new
goal (and this process is known as subgoaling). This new goal becomes a subgoal of
the original one, which means that once the subgoal is achieved, control is returned to
the main goal. The subgoal has its own problem space, state and possible set of oper-
ators. Whenever the subgoal has been achieved it passes its results to the main goal,
thereby resolving the impasse. Learning is keyed to the subgoaling process: whenever
a subgoal has been achieved, new knowledge is added to the knowledge base to prevent
the impasse that produced the subgoal from occurring again (this learning process is
known as chunking). If an impasse occurs because the consequences of an operator are
unknown, and in the subgoal these consequences are subsequently found, knowledge
is added to SOAR’s memory about the consequences of that operator. An important
feature in SOAR concerns the fact that it can also use external input as part of its im-
passe resolution process, therefore new knowledge can extended the Semantic Memory
of SOAR and can be incorporated into the learned rules. In this context, the proposed
system can be integrated, and can extend, the SOAR suboaling procedure as illustrated
in the figure 2. The process of bi-directional translation between a chunk-like represen-
tation and the language of TCL can be provided as introduced in [13] and implemented
in [17], where a typicality-based KB properties is translated into a standard Descrip-
tion Logic knowledge base (corresponding to a chunk-based symbolic representation in
SOAR). In particular, the overall approach is compliant with the idea of a goal-directed
contextual activation of concepts obtained via a process of knowledge “proxyfication”
[26] from the long-term memory to the short term memory of a cognitive agent (already
employed in knowledge-based systems like DUAL-PECCS [33], integrated with differ-
ent cognitive architectures, including SOAR [34, 32]). A final element emerging from
the described compliance consists in the fact that that the output of the new subgoaling
procedure (i.e. the novel concept dynamically generated in the KB and made available
9This problem arises despite the fact that the chunks in SOAR can be represented as a sort of frame-like
structures containing some commonsense (e.g. prototypical) information. We remind to [27] for details
analysis on such issue.
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in the working memory of the architecture to solve the original goal) can be used in the
SOAR learning mechanism known as chunking, which converts the obtained concept
used to solve the goal at hand in the procedural memory of the system in order to avoid
to perform ex-novo the same reasoning cycle in case the agent encouters againg the
same goal to solve.
From a more implementative point of view, the above mentioned integration be-
tween the Semantic Memory in SOAR (SMEM) and our hybrid KB can be obtained as
follows: SMEM is accessed through two dedicated working memory channels, called
ˆcommand and ˆresult. In particular, ˆcommand is the branch of the working
memory buffer where the GOAL setting takes places. In case the goal cannot be satis-
fied, this kind of request, instead of launching a standard search in the SOAR SMEM,
can use our system to select which concepts can be potentially combined to extend the
available knowledge and to solve the goal in hand. This kind of connection can be done
by modifing the SOAR kernel and by creating novel RHS (Right Hand Side) functions
able to launch our system, and its TCL knowledge base in order to take advantage of
the reasoning procedure presented in the above sections. The result of this process will
produce in output a novel prototype-based representation that is can be used to solve
and goal. Such result can be stored in the ˆresult channel, the branch of the SOAR
working memory buffer devoted to acquiring the output from the external modules.
Once the result of our system is “proxyfied” and the goal is solved, it can then be used
in the chunking mechanism of the architecture.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
The capability of integrating and generating novel knowledge to solve problems
is one of the 14 functional criteria individuated by Allen Newell, in his book Unified
Theories of Cognition [39], for a cognitive architecture (criterium nr.6). In this paper,
we have presented a system aimed at specifically addressing this problem by propos-
ing an extension of classical subgoaling procedures through a dynamical, goal-driven,
enrichment of an agent knowledge base obtained via a procedure exploiting a process
of commonsense conceptual combination based on the logic TCL.
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The proposed approach has been tested in the task of object composition and com-
pared with the available results of the system OROC [41] that is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first system proposing a proof-of-concept procedure for the evaluation
of such tasks. In particular, we have shown how our framework is able to generate the
same results provide by the OROC system by adopting different representational and
reasoning assumptions. In addition, we have also compared the obtained results with a
preliminary evaluation involving human subjects in the task of object composition. As
a further element, we have also shown that the proposed framework is compliant with
all the major mechanisms available in the SOAR cognitive architecture and, as such, it
can be effectively used to extend its subgoaling procedures (and therefore the reason-
ing capabilities of the agents equipped with such architecture). In the next section we
review the related works and conclude with some pointers to future developments.
7.1. Related Works
For what concerns the modelling of prototypical concept composition in a human-
like fashion (and with human-level performances), several approaches have been pro-
posed in both the AI and computational cognitive science communities. Lewis and
Lawry [25] present a detailed analysis of the limits of the set-theoretic approaches
[37], the fuzzy logics [47, 8] (whose limitations was already shown in [42, 45, 19]), the
vector-space models [36] and quantum probability approaches [1] proposed to model
this phenomenon. In addition, they propose to use hierarchical conceptual spaces [12]
to model the phenomenon in a way that accurately reflects how humans exploit their
creativity in conjunctive concept combination. While we agree with the authors with
the comments moved to the described approaches, in this work we have shown that
our logic can equally model, in a cognitively compliant-way, the composition of pro-
totypes by using a computationally effective nonmonotonic formalism. In particular,
our model is able to meet all following cognitive requirements [25, 19]: i) it provides a
blocking mechanism of property inheritance for prototypical concept combination thus
enabling the possibility of dealing with a non-standard compositional behavior ii) it is
able to deal with the phenomenon of attribute emergence (and loss) for the combined
concept iii) it explicitly assumes that the combination is not commutative (i.e. the dif-
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ferent attribution of the HEAD-MODIFER roles does non provide the same combined
concept) and that iv) there are dominance effects in the concepts to be combined (both
these effects are obtained via the HEAD-MODIFIER heuristics).
Other attempts similar to the one proposed here concerns the modelling of the con-
ceptual blending phenomenon: a task where the obtained concept is entirely novel and
has no strong association with the two base concepts (for details about the differences
between conceptual combination and conceptual blending see [38]). In this setting, [7]
proposed a mechanism for conceptual blending based on the DL EL++. They construct
the generic space of two concepts by introducing an upward refinement operator that
is used for finding common generalizations of EL++ concepts. However, differently
from us, what they call prototypes are expressed in the standard monotonic formalism,
which does not allow to reason about typicality and defeasible inheritance. More re-
cently, a different approach is proposed in [9], where the authors see the problem of
concept blending as a nonmonotonic search problem and proposed to use Answer Set
Programming (ASP) to deal with this search problem. As we have shown in [31], the
approach adopted in our system is flexible enough to be applied also to the case of
conceptual blending. There is no evidence, however, that both the frameworks of [7]
and [9] would be able to model (in toto or in part) conceptual combination problems
like the object composition task. As such, TCL seems to provide a more general mech-
anism for modelling the combinatorial phenomenon of concept invention (that can be
obtained both with combination and blending).
We are currently developing an efficient reasoner for the logic TCL, relying on the
prover RAT-OWL [17] for reasoning in the nonmonotonic logicALC+TR underlying
our approach and on the well established HermiT reasoner. The first version of the
system is implemented in Pyhton and exploits a translation of anALC+TR knowledge
base into standard ALC.
7.2. Future Works
In future research we aim at extending our approach to more expressive symbolic
formalisms and Description Logics such as, for example, those underlying the standard
OWL language. Starting from the work of [15], applying the logic with the typicality
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operator and the rational closure to the logic SHIQ, we intend to study whether and
how TCL could provide an alternative solution to the problem of the “all or nothing”
behavior of rational closure with respect to property inheritance. This will allow one
to express prototypical properties with a richer language, as well as to perform useful
inferences.
The logicTCL underlying the system is also able to combine more than two concepts
at a time, as well as to involve compound concepts (and not only atomic ones) in a
concept combination. We aim at extending our approach in order to also exploit this
feature. Moreover, in future works, we plan to consider the case in which the system is
able to provide a partial solution, satisfying a proper subset of the initial goals.
The system described in section 4 relies on COCOS, a tool for combining concepts
in the logic TCL. In future research, we aim at studying the application of optimization
techniques in [3, 5] in order to improve the efficiency of COCOS and, a consequence,
of the proposed goal-driven knowledge generation system.
Finally, we aim at extending the evaluation provided in this paper in two directions:
the first one concerns the release of a richer dataset to use for the task of task of Object
Composition for testing both human and artificial creativity (and this will require a truly
interdisciplinary effort). The second one goes in the direction of testing our dynamic
knowledge generation system on larger knowledge bases. This aspect would require
to analyze in more detail heuristic aspects concerning the efficiency about the concept
selection and combination.
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